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Preface 
 
 
Two years ago LEI and Wageningen University carried out a study for the Euro(
pean Commission DG Enterprise and Industry on the competitiveness of the 
European Food Industry. In November 2007 that study played an important role 
in a conference on this issue in Brussels, where European Commission Vice(
President announced the installation of a High Level Group for the Food Industry. 
Recently a follow(up study has been commissioned to the same project team, to 
study a number of issues in more detail for the dairy industry as a representa(
tive sector in the food industry. One of the topics of this study was the problem 
of administrative burdens. This background report presents the results of that 
study. They will be integrated with other topics in a final report published by the 
European Commission.  
 Harry Bremmers of Wageningen University developed the methodology of 
this part of the research, with contributions of the co(authors. The  
e(questionnaire was made operational by John Doornbos. Several students from 
Wageningen University helped to contact the potential respondents. In coopera(
tion with the Universities of Bonn, Bologna (both in the MoniQa network) and Sao 
Paulo we hope to improve the response to the survey for future scientific work.  
We thank the respondents in the dairy industry who used their valuable time to 
answer our survey. We thank DG Enterprise and Industry for their support in this 
study. We hope and expect that the results will be useful in the discussions of 
the High Level Group and that they are inspirational for future scientific work on 
this issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prof. Dr R.B.M. Huirne 
Director General LEI Wageningen UR 
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Summary 
 
 
The goal of this contribution to the assessment of the competitiveness of the 
European dairy industry is to investigate the relationship between regulatory 
burdens and sector competitiveness, with special attention to the associations 
between such burdens and innovation and strategy, food safety & quality sys(
tems, food labelling requirements (origin labelling) and supply chain transpar(
ency. A firm perspective is used. We address the basic structure and 
tendencies in the food sector, the role of regulatory burdens and their effect on 
competitiveness. A theoretical foundation is provided by transaction cost eco(
nomics and total quality management insights. Building on previous studies 
showing the negative impact of administrative burdens on competitiveness, this 
study focuses on expanding the available research framework and to adjust it to 
sector (i.e. dairy) specifics. We will connect to previous research (Wijnands et 
al., 2007) and the findings therein.  
 In this study, we pose the following sub(questions with respect to the asso(
ciation between administrative burdens and dairy industry competitiveness: 
(  what is the relationship between administrative burdens, innovation and com(
petitiveness; 
(  what is the relationship between administrative burdens, food safety & qual(
ity deployment and competitiveness; 
(  what is the relationship between administrative burdens, food labelling re(
quirements and competitiveness; 
(  what is the relationship between administrative burdens, supply chain trans(
parency and competitiveness?  
 
 The effects of legislation on costs and competitiveness are mediated by im(
pacts on innovativeness, company strategy, food safety system availability, as 
well as the available information & communication capabilities in the firms. Es(
pecially SMEs lack resources to be informed and adjust to changes in the legal 
environment. As the European dairy sector is under pressure, and in general is 
extremely innovative (but with extreme differences between individual compa(
nies), the reduction of administrative burdens is regarded as a key policy objec(
tive, to be able to survive in a global arena. We propose a broad conception of 
administrative burdens, comprising financial and non(financial responses to re(
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gulatory changes, obligatory as well as voluntary measures in response to legal 
changes. To frame the impact of administrative burdens, especially with respect 
to food labelling, we discern the following variables: regulatory burdens (content 
and form), level of innovativeness, company strategy, level of food safety sys(
tem implementation and available information and communication capabilities. 
Size, level of network embeddedness, industry and product characteristics were 
treated as control variables. We have connected to previous research (Wijnands 
et al., 2007) which, among others, generated the following generic results: 
(  administrative burdens are connected to prevention measures; 
(  administrative burdens impede on the innovativeness of food companies; 
(  administrative burdens are influenced by the content of law and by the pre(
dictability and clearness of regulations (positive relationship). 
 
 We formulate the following conclusions and key findings: 
 
 Food law, administrative burdens and competitiveness 
(  Although European companies depict areas where EU food law could be 
simplified and specific areas of regulations are seen as burdensome, they 
have a preference for the European system, which fosters food safety above 
litigation. 
  A distinction should be made between the form and the content (sub(
stance) of food law. Especially product innovative companies are dissatisfied 
with the content of food law. Time(to(market of new output is long, costs are 
relatively high (compared to the US), and procedures are intransparent. Le(
gal prescriptions are scattered and a comprehensive overview is often lack(
ing (see Van der Meulen, 2008 for details). 
( European dairy companies have a strong preference for the European legal 
system; they are inclined to accept relatively high administrative burdens 
(especially in comparison with the US) for the sake of food safety and qual(
ity. In other words: they will not choose for a policy that reduces administra(
tive burdens at the expense of food safety and quality. 
( The European food law with respect to the dairy industry is evaluated as be(
ing relatively good. European dairy firms do not express a preference for the 
American system. 
 
 Innovation and strategy 
( On the one hand, companies in the dairy industry that foster product innova(
tion will be negatively impacted by procedural obligations. On the other han(
d, process innovations are stimulated by food law, since systems and 
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procedures have to be installed. Companies that foster process innovations 
accept administrative requirements more easily than companies that foster 
product innovations. 
 
 Labelling 
( Policy towards SMEs should be adjusted to product characteristics and sup(
ply chain position. The benefits of co(labelling depend on these two vari(
ables. 
( Co(labelling ( printing the name of the processor on the package of the end(
producer/retailer ( is only beneficial (benefits outweigh administrative bur(
dens) if the producer (SME) procures a differentiated product, which is not 
easy to copy. For commodities (homogeneous produce which is supplied by 
many companies) upscaling in intermediary production stages will be inevi(
table, to reduce costs. In the long run, SMEs producing homogeneous out(
put will necessarily merge, to enhance economies of scale. Upscaling of 
commodity(production will be to the benefit of efficiency of food supply 
chains and should therefore not be obstructed. 
( EU(Origin labelling will hide intra(communal food safety and quality differ(
ences. On the other hand, it could stimulate exports (especially to non(
western countries). Companies will prefer to distinguish themselves on their 
brand(name, PGI/PDO and food safety and quality characteristics. Origin la(
belling (a 'made in EU' label) has a contra(productive effect, because it hides 
company( and country(specific differences. Moreover, the EU as a whole will 
be vulnerable should food or political problems occur. 
 
 Transparency 
( Despite the pressure to install HACCP, food safety and quality systems are 
more provoked by clients' wishes than by legal obligations. So the costs 
which are connected to them would possibly have been made even if food 
legislations would not impose them. Integration of food safety and quality 
requirements can alleviate compliance costs.  
( In general, there is not a broad preference for increased chain transparency 
through co(labelling. Technically there are barriers if such transparency 
should be improved by means of labelling.  
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1 Introduction 
 
 
This report sketches a part of the detailed findings of a research on behalf of 
DG Enterprise of the European Union competitiveness of the dairy sector of the 
European food and drinks industry, the effect of administrative burdens and the 
impact of a European labelling scheme. This report concentrates especially on 
the impact of administrative burdens. The goal of the paper is to frame the  
effect of regulatory burdens in a research outline which enables the study of 
their effect on the competitiveness of the food and drinks industry, especially 
the European dairy sector. A firm perspective is used. Special attention is paid 
to the connections of demands from and changes in the regulatory framework 
with innovativeness, food safety and quality system deployment, labelling re(
quirements and transparency in the food chain (co labelling, from the perspec(
tive of private label sales).  
 
The following activities and questions specify our intentions:  
- to delineate ‘administrative burdens' from other administrative requirements 
which are connected with a changing legal framework, especially origin la(
belling; 
- to construct a theoretical framework which can be used to explain the rela(
tionship between changing legal requirements, administrative burdens (es(
pecially connected with origin labelling) and competitiveness of the dairy 
industry, from a company perspective; 
- to deliberate on the relationship between administrative burdens, innovation 
and competitiveness; 
- to deliberate on the relationship between administrative burdens, food safety 
and quality deployment and competitiveness; 
- to investigate the relationship between administrative burdens, food labelling 
requirements and competitiveness; 
- and to investigate the relationship between administrative burdens, supply 
chain transparency and competitiveness.  
 
 The European food and drinks industry is, with a turnover of €800 billion 
and 4 million people employed, the biggest manufacturing sector in Europe 
(CIAA, 2006). Eleven percent of world exports of agricultural and food and drink 
products originate from the EU; the share however is shrinking while shares of 
China, Brazil, Australia and New Zealand are increasing (CIAA(b, 2006, p. 7). 
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Dairy product exports reach up to 12% of food and drink exports, but have de(
clined significantly in recent years. The expansion of this sector relies to a large 
extent on its competitiveness outside the EU and the level of quality & safety 
assurance inside. The promotion of food quality and avoidance of food hazards 
is of imminent importance for consumer safety and for safeguarding a competi(
tive position in the international arena.  
 However, an abundant system of prescriptive legislation has been created, 
both at the level of the Community as on National levels. In many cases, admin(
istrative and other compliance costs increased excessively. As a result of the 
Lisbon call  
 
'to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge(based economy in 
the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better 
jobs and greater social cohesion' (cited in CIAA(a, 2005), 
 
initiatives have been taken to improve legislation and (thereby) reduce adminis(
trative burdens. Administrative burdens are a result of public intervention, which 
is an alternative to the rule of the free market. Public intervention may use in(
struments like: information procurement, process standards, product perform(
ance standards and pecuniary measures (Henson and Traill, 1993). 
 
Governance of the food industry 
In this report we assess the factors that affect the competitiveness of sectors in 
the European food industry, especially with respect to labelling and (the con(
nected) administrative burdens. Costs which result from regulation play an im(
portant role in the willingness to comply to it, especially for those food firms 
which are exclusively or dominantly profit(seeking. 
 Governance of the European food industry poses a choice between self(
regulation (of which voluntary labelling is an example) and command(and(control 
(of which mandatory food labelling is an example), or a combination of these 
(Sinclair, 1997). 'Pure' self(regulation could have negative consequences for the 
welfare of nations if public goods (like environmental sustainability, population 
health) are involved, for which property rights are ill(defined, or if a lack of 
transparency (like of food safety level, origin, or GMO content) creates a situa(
tion of asymmetric information (with possibilities of opportunistic behaviour; Wil(
liamson, 1985). An example of the first is the adoption of environmental 
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sustainability by private enterprise. A 'neo(classical' approach to the environ(
mental problem presupposes unlimited resource(substitution possibilities, a  
'time(less' world in which technological innovation is produced instantly and at 
will, and a voluntary internalisation. Self(regulation as such does not make com(
panies survive in a competitive environment, on the contrary (Rumelt 1990, 
Reinhardt 1999, Christmann and Taylor 2001).  
 In the past, regulatory stringency has been the dominant instrument to 
achieve food safety and sustainable production. The deployment of a 'hierarchi(
cal enforcement' policy is considered by many as inefficient and costly, stifling 
innovation and inviting enforcement difficulties (Fairman and Yapp 2005). Car(
ried out to the extreme, this policy would require the use of so many natural and 
social resources that the net(benefits would be marginal. With respect to the 
food industry, pure self(regulation could go at the cost of consumer's health. 
Moreover, leaving food supply to the market would possibly lead to price dete(
rioration to an extent that individual firms would perish in the long run. For a 
long time, theories of industrial organisation fostered the influence of market 
structure on profitability of firms (Roquebert et al., 1996). It considers firms as 
passive entities, which is a narrow view on reality. Many firms in the present Eu(
ropean food industry have the power to pursue a market strategy. Food compa(
nies' strategies should be considered in the effect of rules and regulations. 
Nevertheless, the 'passive model' of reactive adjustment to environmental for(
ces applies to many companies in the European food industry, since most of 
them belong to the SMEs (< 250 employees), employing 61.3% of personnel in 
the sector (CIAA(a, 2005, p. 4). Lengthy customs' procedures are one indicative 
factor explaining the lack of export growth (CIAA(b 2006, p.28).  
 The 'active model', however, stresses the inner strength of companies by 
exploiting its basic resources (a stream called the resource(based view; Barney, 
1991).  
 Why should companies comply to burdensome public regulations? As to Cor(
nelissen (2004b) the profit(seeking firm will comply to regulatory requirements if 
the benefits of complying are bigger than the costs, or alternatively, if the dis(
advantages of not(complying exceed the costs of complying. Costs and benefits 
can be vested in profits or reputation (damage). Positive compliance decisions 
will be made comparing the perceived marginal benefit of compliance or the 
perceived marginal cost of non compliance with the perceived marginal costs of 
compliance (Henson and Heasman, 1998, referring to Baron and Baron, 1980). 
With respect to information costs to be made to comply, rational firms and indi(
viduals will spend such costs to the point where the marginal benefits (dis(
counted error costs) are equal to the marginal costs of information procurement 
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(Ogus, 1992). If marginal error costs are low, it follows that individuals will not 
spend much money on information costs. Where marginal error costs are high 
(for instance: possibility of death, heavy injury, costly recalls in food industry et 
cetera), the willingness to spend money on information procurement will be 
high. Since lack of food safety is perceived as a serious cause for possible per(
sonal harm, the willingness to spend costs on reducing such risk through infor(
mation may be high. 
 In general, excessive administrative burdens increase transaction costs in 
the market and will therefore impede on the competitiveness of food firms. It is 
not clear in advance whether administrative requirements are higher in a com(
mon law system (UK, US) or in a regulatory (European, continental) system of 
law. Possibly the ex ante costs (costs of acquiring and assimilating information 
before the legal rule is formulated) are higher (Ogus, 1992) in a continental sys(
tem, which is based on prevention of risks, instead of litigation. On the contrary, 
the ex(post costs in a common law system will presumably be higher. Excessive 
administrative burdens is only one problem with which the European food and 
drinks sector is confronted. It is related to other tendencies which provoke a 
loss of competitiveness (CIAA(a, 2005, p. 4): 
( lack of investments in R&D and innovation performance; as SMEs have lower 
profit margins, budgets for R&D are presumably low also. Spendings on 
R&D are relatively low with 0.32% of output in the EU; 
( globalisation and increased competition from countries with comparative ad(
vantages in basic food production; 
( slow productivity growth. 
 
 How can the industry address these problems, and what role does the legis(
lative process play in this respect? To be able to formulate a conceptual model 
to address this question, the administrative burden concept is first delineated in 
the next chapter 3. 
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2 Administrative burdens: delineation of 
 concepts 
 
 
It is an expressed goal of the Commission to reduce administrative burdens by 
25% in 2012. The effect that is expected from a reduction on EU as well as na(
tional levels is an increase of GDP of 1.4% (€150bn) in the mid(term (COM 
(2007)23 ref. to: Gelauff and Lejour (2005)). For instance, for The Netherlands 
at the end of 2002 the administrative burdens were €23,780 per firm 
(€16.4bn for 689,623 companies in total, according to the Dutch EIM/CBS; 
Suyver and Tom, 2004), while in 2007, on the basis of Ministry plans in 2002, 
these burdens should be €3bn lower, reducing the average burdens with 
€4,500 per firm. However, it was also projected that large firms would benefit 
13x more than small firms. Small companies were projected to benefit €3,560 
(in total: 76%), medium(sized companies €7,327 and big companies €45,735 
(Suyver and Tom, 2004, table 5.1). Other countries and organisations have 
proposed similar policy goals. In Sweden an action plan was initiated to select 
areas of regulation that can be simplified or changed to reduce burdens, on the 
basis of the Dutch Standard Cost Model. Also organisations like CIAA have pro(
posed initiatives to improve and simplify the EU regulatory framework (CIAA(a, 
2005, p. 3). CIAA is especially concerned about the research drain in biotech(
nology, the cost of pre(market approval of novel foods, regulation about legal 
additives, easing up regulations for nutrition and health claims, food labelling 
(modernisation, simplification and consolidation, the stimulation of self(regulation 
and the exclusion of food and food ingredients from the scope of Reach (Re(
vised Chemicals policy). 
 The delineation of administrative burdens (based on the standard cost 
model) is given in figure 2.1. Administrative burdens, as to EU definitions, refer 
in a broad sense (including labelling, monitoring, reporting and assessment) to 
all information requirements (either to public or private bodies) that are induced 
by regulatory activity and would not be performed if such legal obligations would 
not exist.  
 There is much diversity however in the vocabulary which is used to delineate 
regulatory ( including ‘administrative'( burdens. The UK Hampton report sug(
gests that the costs of regulation can be split up in (Scrivens, 2007): 
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( policy costs: the costs inherent in meeting the aims of a regulation (direct 
cash costs +  investments, or changes in organisation of a firm necessary to 
meet obligations); 
( administrative costs ( costs of gathering information about a business, or 
checking on  a business's compliance. 
 
 The report especially addresses the costs of inspection of regulatory bodies 
to guarantee compliance. It argues, among others, that risk assessment can 
reduce the number of inspections, that such inspections should be made only 
with a reason, and forms and procedures should be simplified.  
 
Figure 2.1  Delineation of administrative burdens (based on COM 
(2007) 23) 
 
 
 
 Further specifications of the concept ‘administrative burdens' are found in 
the outline that describes the Dutch Standard Cost Model to assess such costs. 
In the Dutch version (The Hague, 2003) a distinction is made between obliga(
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tions to 'do or don't', and information obligations. As to the Dutch system, ad(
ministrative burdens are costs to enterprises to come up to information obliga(
tions which result from regulation and legislation by the government. Costs from 
self(regulation are not covered by the administrative burden concept. The main 
difference between the (original) Dutch standard cost system is vested in the 
fact that the EU system includes also voluntary information costs of public au(
thorities, whereas the Dutch system only regards the information costs of en(
terprises. In the original Dutch outline, voluntary measures to come up to 
information requirements are included in the administrative burden concept, 
whereas in the derived EU(system, there should be a legal requirement to take 
information measures. Benefits which are connected to obligatory information 
requirements are not considered as a 'negative' administrative burden. Adminis(
trative burdens in the Dutch system are measured using (among others) the fol(
lowing principles (the Hague, 2003): 
( concrete and measurable (not qualitative); 
( only costs are included, not the benefits; 
( if the costs are compensated by a financial compensation, they are not in(
cluded; 
( structural costs should be quantified; 
( one(time costs should be quantified and attributed to different periods; 
( costs of monitoring legal changes are included in the concept; 
( registrations for multiple purposes are attributed to regulation and legisla(
tion, that causes the burden. 
 
 The OECD's Red Tape Assessment ('Scoreboard') project was initiated to 
compare administrative burdens over several countries (among others: Nether(
lands, USA, United Kingdom and Italy), using a slightly adapted version of the 
Dutch Standard Cost Model; similar studies were performed by the World Bank 
and World Economic Forum (OECD, 2007). As to the OECD, the abandonment 
of additional regulatory requirements which supplement necessary regulations 
could reduce administrative burdens. The more open an economy is, the less 
governments are able or willing to regulate domestic economic activity (Pevcin, 
2006 referring to Pryor, 2001). 
 Within this report administrative burdens (narrowly defined) are 'the informa(
tion costs which are caused by changing legal requirements and made for com(
plying with them'. We call these 'level 1 costs'. They can be measured for 
administrative bodies and/or for private enterprises. A broad view encompasses 
all impacts to administrative and/or private bodies (so also other costs, ex(
pressed in money terms, than information costs are included; this we call: level 
  
 
16 
2 costs. An even more broadened view encompasses not only financial bur(
dens, but also qualitative burdens (like environmental and social impacts): this is 
'level 3 costs'. The investigation of such causal effects is of importance for the 
construction of an impact analysis. Last, also the voluntarily imposed burdens 
are included (like private ISO systems which is installed to protect food safety, 
and the like (this is level 4 in our analysis). 
 We propose to depart from this broadened view. However, empirical results 
should be organised in such a way, that also data on the other levels can be 
provided. 
 
Figure 2.2  A broad view on administrative burdens 
 
information costs as
a result of complying
expressed in money terms
I
II I+ including other financial costs/effects
III II + non-financial effects
IV III + voluntary measures for regulatory requirements
 
 
 Cumulative regulatory burdens, as defined in COM (2006) 691 of 14 De(
cember 2006 are extra legislation which impedes the placing of a food product 
on the market with the ensuing consequences for competitiveness, or raise 
costs in an unjustifiable way to economic operators which lead to price increase 
of the end food product, or prolong the time(to(market. Cumulative administra(
tive burdens are caused by unnecessary legislation. Unnecessary regulation 
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hampers international trade and competition. Regulations are called unneces(
sary (cumulative) if they are superfluous for coming up to the goal of a legisla(
tion or for guaranteeing the level of protection the Treaties offer. WTO(articles 
(article XX) and Agreements (with respect to Trade, Sanitary and Phyto(sanitary 
measures for instance), restrict regulation to a level that obstructs international 
trade more than necessary to reach the legal objective (Kalinova, 2005).  
 As expressed, unnecessary or extra regulations ('goldplating') can cause 
avoidable costs and obstruct competitiveness substantially. For instance, the 
costs of plant variety protection with a 15 years' protection period are 
USD5,687 in China, USD10,480 in the EU and USD4,344 in the US (based on 
Louwaars et al., 2005 cited in: Tripp et al., 2007). The Action Program (COM 
(2007) 23) addresses EC regulations and directives, national transposition and 
implementing measures connected with these, as well as national and regional 
abundant information obligations. Expressed priorities with respect to investiga(
tion of excessive administrative burdens are Directive 2000/13/EC of the Euro(
pean Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 on the adjustment of 
Member state laws with respect to the labelling, presentation and advertising of 
foodstuffs, as well as information obligations with respect to GMO traceability 
rules (Regulation 1830/2003). Both regulatory revisions can act upon dairy 
processors, as well as on other companies in the food sector. An example of 
'goldplating' outside the food sector is given by Directive 95/46/EU, governing 
the protection of privacy. The EU(directive contains 72 considerations and 34 
articles, while the Dutch implementation (Wbp) contains more than is required 
with a minimal implementation: 200 considerations and 83 articles (Cuypers, 
2006).  
 Often, but not necessarily, goldplating is linked to such national add(ups in 
the transposition of EU law to national law. Within our research, we conceive 
'goldplating' as being vested in: 
- the translation of EU regulations in national laws and other requirements; 
- the translation of national laws and requirements in company information 
systems and other company devices (like investments, procedures et cet(
era).  
 For instance, misconception of national rules could lead to over(compliance 
on a company level. Both could impede (or promote) the competitiveness of the 
European dairy sector. 
 Regulatory burdens are a result of legal content, but also of their form 
(clearness, consistency et cetera) As to Cuijpers (2006) vague and open norms, 
complexity and uncertainty of interpretation, new procedures and burdens, dis(
congruence with the privacy(understanding of the citizen as well as the lack of 
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stimuli for self(regulation are the result of excessive legal requirements. Admin(
istrative burdens could distract assets from opportunities to invest in opera(
tional and marketing activities, which leads to declining competitive 
performance. Possibly more than proportional burdens are created in food law 
requirements. While the creation of food safety systems is automatically affect(
ing administrative burdens and such systems are generally accepted, the im(
plementation of new labelling requirements, GMO and Novel Food(related 
impediments and product(oriented requirements of innovation can hamper com(
petitiveness if such requirements are unevenly distributed over countries. Regu(
latory and administrative burdens will disproportionally affect competitiveness if: 
(  the burdens are not compensated by benefits with respect to food safety 
and quality, improved transparency or other (societal) factors that positively 
affect the food system; 
(  growth and market shares are affected disproportionally; 
(  innovativeness is obstructed more than necessary. 
 
 We will sketch a theoretical perspective in the next chapter (3) to be able to 
coherently analyse the influential factors on competitiveness in general, and the 
effect of administrative burdens in specific. 
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3 Theoretical framework 
 
 
Two complementary theoretical orientations can be used to measure the effect 
of regulatory burdens, including its costs, on competitiveness of individual firms. 
We propose: 
( the total quality management framework (TQM), paragraph 3.1; 
( the transaction cost framework (TCE), paragraph 3.2. 
 
 
3.1 The TQM framework 
 
Total quality management is a practical approach to enhance product as well as 
process quality aspects, strategic attitude (top(management involvement) and 
organisational behaviour through empowerment of employees. Consumer 
needs, not technological governance, is the starting(point of all quality proc(
esses (Spencer, 1994; Hackman and Wageman, 1995). As opposed to the 
'Deming' principles of quality', the TQM principles are not universally applicable, 
but their application depends on the characteristics of a specific firm. Process(
control is fostered to reduce unnecessary sacrifices of inputs. In general, it is 
supposed that the costs of bad quality are far greater than costs of avoiding 
bad quality (Hackman and Wageman, 1995), although quality has a price which 
could be excessive. So, with respect to quality costs, two opposing tendencies 
can be discerned: prevention costs (including appraisal costs) and failure costs. 
Prevention costs increase with higher levels of quality assurance (within this out(
line: of regulatory stringency), while at the same time failure costs are reduced 
(costs of non(compliance, such as is the case with food(borne diseases et cet(
era). While the European system fosters prevention (risk avoidance), the US sys(
tem of litigation fosters compensation of failure. The question is what, at the 
firm level, the ‘ideal' combination is of both policies, given that fact that preven(
tion costs have to be weighted against failure costs.  
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3.2 The transaction cost approach 
 
Transaction cost theory provides a new perspective on the structuring of eco(
nomic organisation. While former theorising conceptualised a firm as a produc(
tion function, transaction cost economics regards a firm as a governance 
mechanism (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Williamson, 1998). Likewise, eco(
nomic organisation can be governed in a hierarchical way (like a ( vertically inte(
grated ( firm) or leave the economic exchange and its characteristics to market 
governance. Hierarchies (integration) cause bureaucratic costs, which induce a 
tendency towards market governance. However, dimensions of governance like 
the necessity of asset specific investments (translated to the study at hand: in(
vestments in for instance quality assurance systems induced by buyers to en(
hance food safety, combined with lack of information, asymmetrically 
distributed information, or (market) uncertainty can lead to opportunistic behav(
iour and shirking, so that a hierarchy is preferred (translated to our research: 
governmental intervention is necessary). Transaction cost economics especially 
regard the consequences of incomplete contracts as a result of limited rational(
ity and information. In general, asset specificity forms a strong bias towards hi(
erarchy (governmental intervention; David and Han, 2004; Geyskens et al., 
2006; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). The role of food labels, from a transaction 
cost perspective, is the improvement of information processing so that con(
tracting is facilitated. 
 Within this research, the following combinations of the two theoretical view(
points can be discerned (figure 3.1). 
 Figure 3.1 shows that labelling can be regarded as an instrument to pro(
mote market efficiency, or as an instrument to control firms. Both are directed 
at protecting buyers from inefficient purchase decisions. Perceptions on the 
usefulness of labelling information affects the opinion whether or not mandatory 
nutritional labelling would be beneficial (Gracia et al., 2006). However, useful(
ness of labelling information does not always implicate that buying behaviour is 
adjusted (see in this respect: Hefle et al., 2007). With respect to origin labelling 
an extensive research by Loureiro and Umberger (2007) in the US shows that 
US consumers prefer USDA safety inspection over country-of-origin la-
belling. As to these authors, revealing origin make sense if the origin stands for 
higher food safety or quality. Labelling bridges the information gap between 
consumers/buyers and suppliers with respect to basic  
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Figure 3.1  TQM and TCE 
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characteristics of a product or service. Labelling which is not governed by regu(
lation and certification is possibly victim of opportunism. An example in this re(
spect is eco(labelling. Despite European efforts to establish authorised, non(
compulsory ecological labelling (Eco(label I in CEE 92/880 and Eco(label II in CE 
1980/2000; Proto et al., 2007), variations in eco(labels are widespread and 
said to be more confusing than informative. According to Van Amstel et al. 
(2006) the reliability of information of five investigated food labels showed se(
vere shortcomings, and do not fill the information gap between seller and buyer.  
 The overview we presented in figure 3.2 coincides to a large extent with 
Loader and Hobbs' (1999) options to reduce information costs for consumers: 
(1) product certification or labelling at the firm(level, (2) legislative protection in 
the form of labelling regulations (also in: Unnevehr and Jensen, 1996) and (3) 
tort liability law (with the chance of market failure).  
 
 
3.3 Research framework 
 
Next, we present a research framework which visualises the proposed effect of 
regulatory burdens and key factors (innovativeness, strategy, food safety sys(
tem availability and information processing capabilities) impacting on the com(
petitiveness of a highly innovative sector, like dairy is (see figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2  Framework for the analysis of the administrative burden 
effects 
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 Components of the research framework are addressed in the following sub(
paragraphs: 
( innovativeness and strategy (paragraph 3.3.1); 
( food safety system availability (paragraph 3.3.2); 
( information and communication capabilities (paragraph 3.3.3). 
 
3.3.1 Innovativeness and strategy 
 
Administrative and monitoring requirements will hamper the acquisition of capa(
bilities to innovate disproportionally because of resource scarcity at the firm's 
level (compare: Avermaete et al., 2004; Batterink et al., 2006; Romijn and Al(
baladejo, 2002; Loader and Hobbs, 1999). 'Innovativeness' can be radical or in 
some degree incremental (Ettlie et al., 1984), can be process as well as prod(
uct(oriented, and address exploitative and/or explorative changes of product(
market configurations. The innovation orientation is associated with a firm's 
strategy. Regulatory demands converging with the company's strategy will be 
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welcomed more easily than a ‘generic' food and drink safety policy. This implies 
that the perception of a set of rules being 'burdensome' is dependent on the 
firm(specific aims and strategies that are intended to be deployed. Firm strate(
gies can be classified on a range from ‘defender' to ‘prospector' (Miles et al., 
1978; Morgan et al., 2000). A defender company will, in general, tend towards 
a cost(oriented strategy; it defends its market share by the provision of prod(
ucts with similar quality characteristics as competitors, but at lower prices. On 
the contrary, prospector companies aggressively seek for new market opportu(
nities and develop new products and/or markets to outperform competitors. 
Prospector companies are well equipped for product change with available R&D 
departments and information and communication resources.  
 Innovativeness and business renewal can be affected by legislative efforts 
along two routes: formal and content. Searching for causes for excessive ad(
ministrative burdens should therefore include an investigation of the formal as(
pects connected to law change: its predictability, consistency, proportionality 
and the level of perceived behavioural control of changes in production and/or 
product characteristics. With ‘controllability' we depict the possibilities to im(
plement and/or act in conformity with regulator wishes. 'Proportionality' refers 
to a necessary balance of consequences for companies, buyers and competi(
tors, inside and outside the EU. Whether there is proportionality depends eco(
nomically on the costs needed to comply versus the positive profitability and 
cash(flow effects that are harvested. With respect to the dairy sector it should 
be noted that many firms are highly innovative. Innovation in this sector will likely 
to be hampered by, among other (CIAA(a, p. 6): 
( legislation on genetically modified organisms; 
( legislation with respect to nutrition and health claims (the possibility to claim 
a nutritional or health benefit connected to a product); the changed con(
sumer behaviour and consciousness of health consequences of food intake 
as well as nutritional properties of (novel) foods, makes innovation in this 
area of extreme importance; 
( pre(market approval schemes of novel foods and additives with an average 
time(to(market of two years. 
 
 While the European dairy sector in general is innovative, the spread in inno(
vativeness is very wide, ranging from companies that for instance pack milk and 
try to optimise processes, and companies that modify the basic characteristics 
of inputs (Omega3 for instance) and/or output (for instance dairy products to 
which health claims will be attached).  
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3.3.2 Food safety system availability 
 
Food safety systems can improve transparency and consumer's trust, but in 
many cases companies are obliged to install or expand information systems on 
legal grounds (for instance to adjust for food labelling requirements) (see: Cas(
well and Padberg, 1992; Przyrembel, 2004), which require extra costs. Espe(
cially SMEs will possibly be more than proportionally affected in their 
profitability, while at the same time they cannot easily harvest the 'quality(
premium'. Administrative burdens are among others induced by compulsory 
quality systems (like HACCP). Costs of quality assurance can be measured with 
the P(A(F method (prevention, appraisal and failure costs; Schiffauerova, 2006). 
If these costs exceed perceived benefits, food legislation effects on competi(
tiveness will be registered. The rationale behind the model is that lower failure 
costs are to be compared with increasing appraisal and prevention efforts, if 
product quality is improved. The scheme can easily be adapted to serve pur(
poses in other fields, like environmental management (see for instance: Watson 
et al., 2004), or the costs of law implementation. Formally, administrative bur(
dens could be arranged under each category of quality costs, but the appraisal 
costs will be the biggest causal factor (= costs of 'operating' food safety assur(
ance systems). Executing food safety requirements causes operational costs, 
while also prevention costs will accelerate administrative requirements. Preven(
tion costs are costs which are made to prevent a(conformity with legal require(
ments. Companies can be confronted with higher administrative loads, but could 
take this for granted for different reasons, like improved competitive power 
and/or a better food and drink safety/quality. Food safety and quality assurance 
systems may be adopted on a voluntary basis. While the systems cost money, 
they may reduce transaction costs in international trade by assuring a certain 
level of quality. They may therefore also serve as trade barriers (Holleran et al., 
1999), and in this way, adversely, stimulate competitive performance. We sug(
gest that dairy companies that already have certified food safety/quality sys(
tems at their disposal, will favour regulatory changes with relative ease. 
 
3.3.3 Information and communication capabilities 
 
In situations of asymmetrically distributed information and market imperfections, 
labelling can enhance flexibility, efficiency, responsiveness and informedness 
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(for instance: the willingness to comply by producers) in the market (see exten(
sively Van Amstel, 2006). Provision of information to the market, in the form of 
labels, brochures et cetera, requires the organisation to be able to process in(
formation and to communicate in a structured way. Food labels can serve dif(
ferent purposes: 
( inform about a certain level of guaranteed food safety; 
( indicate a level of environmental conformity; 
( indicate a certain level of social adequateness of the processes behind the 
food products; 
( indicate identity (origin); 
( information about the composition of a product, i.e., its nutritional value (EU(
Council Directive on Nutrition Labelling for food stuffs (90/496/EEC. 
 
 Mark of origin labelling guarantees that a certain product has (1) passed 
through, or (2) been produced, or (3) carries the legal assurance of (4) or is to a 
certain level produced in a certain place, region or country. Economically labels 
provide a message about safety, quality, taste or any other food characteristic 
which influences the perceived usefulness of that product. So they compensate 
for a lack of informedness on the side of the buyer of a product or service. 
Food labels are valued positively on an individual or firm basis, if the marginal 
costs of providing them ('production' costs, costs of control et cetera) are lower 
then the marginal benefits. In the case of marking for origin, the benefit lies in 
the increased competitiveness or competitive performance for the company, as 
well as the social and environmental effects of the labelling requirement. The 
role of labelling should be viewed in connection with the role of direct regulatory 
bodies (like the FDA in the USA or the EFSA in Europe). The stronger the ex(post 
litigation, the lower the perceived value of mandatory labelling (providing ex ante 
information) will be. Since in general the European culture fosters ex ante infor(
mation and prevention over ex post litigation, it is not surprising that a labelling 
policy over a system of rules and sanctions will be preferred.  
 Building information and communication capabilities (leading to information 
processing through labelling and the like) does not enrol overnight, but is a 
process which takes place in phases. As Hutter says, responsiveness of firms 
to regulatory requirements is described in three phases (Hutter, 2001 as cited 
in Cornelissen, 2004a): 
(1) the design of procedures/rules/systems to introduce the requirements in 
the organisation; 
(2) the operationalisation phase (auditing, enforcements of rules et cetera); 
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(3) the phase in which rules/procedures (compliance) are part of normal, every(
day life. 
 
 In an assessment of competitiveness, the phase in which companies operate 
should be taken into account. Other control variables are addressed in the next 
paragraph 3.3.4. 
 Whereas food labels create transparency on (among others) the characteris(
tics of the supply chain, private labels play a special function in this respect. Pri(
vate labels are 'all merchandise sold under a retailer's brand. That brand can be 
the retailer's own name or a name created exclusively by that retailer' (Private 
Label manufacturers' Association definition in: Bergès(Sennou et al., 2008). 
They can create homogeneity with respect to a multitude of suppliers on the 
one hand, but on the other hand the craftsmanship of supplying intermediate 
companies is hidden. This is the more disadvantageous for the intermediary 
company the more innovative it is, since innovation has a price which can only 
be earned back by means of a premium on the selling price. With the private la(
bel holder controlling the distribution channel, it is a matter of negotiation 
whether such a premium is harvested. In this process, private label holders will 
take a strong position because of the scale at which they buy. Moreover, if an 
intermediary producer also serves the consumer market directly (which could 
take place in competition with the private label it supplies) he experiences price 
erosion and sales decline because of the relatively low price of the alternative. 
 Private labels serve to reduce administrative burdens to the consumer (be(
cause of homogeneity of product and quality), while scale effects lead to lower 
prices. However, they increase costs for (intermediate) producers (regulation of 
the supply by the direct label holder), they experience direct competition for 
their sales to consumers, and will possibly be inclined to sell at relatively low 
prices (which is not the case under all circumstances; see Gabrielson and Sør(
gard (2007); Bergès(Sennou et al. (2008). We therefore suggest that upstream 
producers of differentiated products will foster transparency of the supply chain 
to enhance their image for the end(user. 
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Table 3.1 Price differential between private label and manufacturer 
brands by country (%) 
Country  PL price differen9
tial 
Country PL price differen9
tial 
Greece (48 Philippines (32 
Australia (47 South Korea (31 
Germany (46 Mexico (28 
Belgium (45 South Africa (28 
Czech Republic (44 US (28 
Spain (44 Switzerland (27 
Hungary (43 Canada (27 
Ireland (42 Denmark (27 
Portugal (42 Italy (26 
France (40 Chile (26 
Austria (40 Netherlands (26 
Slovakia (38 Japan (25 
Sweden (38 Israel (23 
Croatia (37 Brazil (20 
Finland (36 Puerto Rico (19 
UK (36 Colombia (19 
Argentina (35 Singapore (13 
Norway (34 Hong Kong (10 
New Zealand (33 Thailand (10 
Source: AC Nielsen, 2005, p. 17. 
 
 
3.3.4 Control variables 
 
Size 
An important control variable is the size of companies. SMEs might be con(
fronted with disproportionately larger compliance costs, because economies of 
scale are lacking (Loader and Hobbs, 1999). Administrative complexity has ( in 
the long(run ( a negative impact on the level of business ownership and (thus) 
entrepreneurship (Stell and Stunnenberg 2007). Administrative burdens refer, 
among others to the costs to be made to investigate changes in the legal sys(
tem. As to Cornelissen (2004a), small firms ( in particular in biotechnology ( do 
not necessarily have a limited knowledge and comprehension of the law. The 
research on the subject is very meagre up(to(date. Cornelissen (2004a) op(
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poses the results of a study from Genn (1993), who studied the permeation of 
health and safety regulations in industrial and agricultural business. A distinction 
was found between highly motivated, proactive employers (with numerous 
sources of information ( and a perception of a need to keep informed and in line 
with regulations), and a second group of firms with employers who were less 
motivated and reactive. This distinction was, in further studies, also ascribed to 
large versus small firms. We propose that size is directly related to the capacity 
to inform and be informed about legal requirements and possible changes.  
 
Network embeddedness 
Companies are, to a smaller or larger extent, entangled in a web of relation(
ships, forcing them to adopt the norms and practices in the business network. 
But they also can be change(oriented and put their own goals and standards 
first, relying on unique resources to adjust their environment inside(out (Porter 
and Kramer, 2006). In practice, both tendencies can occur at the same time 
and in the same organisation.  
 Food safety often cannot be inspected ex ante by buyers in the supply chain. 
A situation of information asymmetry exists, in which sellers usually have more 
information than buyers (Loader and Hobbs, 1999). The buyers could solve this 
problem by performing checks themselves, which would lead to an increase of 
transaction costs (and thus loss of efficiency of markets). Especially end(
consumers experience food risks 'seemingly irrational and inconsistent' (Ver(
beke et al., 2007), exaggerating food risks (compared to experts' opinions) be(
yond proportion. We suggest that the more embedded companies are, the more 
support they experience in assessing and coming up to legal requirements; they 
will therefore experience lower administrative burdens than companies that op(
erate on an isolated basis. 
 
Product characteristics 
Specific requirements with respect to dairy product (like almost complete ab(
sence of dioxin in raw milk) will have an impact on the production and procure(
ment processes of raw material. Differences between countries will affect the 
competitive position of European dairy industry. 
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Industry characteristics 
Generic trends and tendencies in the business environment (which can be cate(
gorised by means of Porter's diamond) will affect the individual business. Differ(
ences between countries or regional differences on a global basis will have to 
be considered. 
 
Summary 
Summarising, figure 3.2 depicts that changing legal requirements (its content 
and form (clearness, completeness, complexity et cetera)), for instance with re(
spect to food safety and/or labelling requirements, have an influence on firm 
management: 
(  on the firms' strategy deployment (will for instance hamper or stimulate the 
strategy choice (what markets to enter, what products to produce, what 
consumers to focus at); 
(  the level of innovativeness; pre(market approvals, the possibility to claim 
health influences, the level of protection of new products et cetera all will di(
rectly be affected by legislation; moreover, administrative requirements 
claim scarce resources which cannot be allocated to more productive desti(
nations; 
(  the level of system availability; companies that have the systems available to 
address food safety regulation will possibly better be able to cope with 
changing legal requirements; 
(  the routines and competences on information gathering, ordering, interpre(
tation and storage. Origin labelling possibly will be evaluated with available 
information and communication capabilities, which give opportunities to ex(
ploit it commercially. 
 
 A ( to a large extent ( non(managerial influence to firms included in figure 3.2 
is the administrative and other burdens that will be affected. These burdens ha(
ve a negative impact on the competitiveness of the dairy industry. Control vari(
ables that mediate between the effect of the mentioned factors and 
competitiveness are possibly: company size, industry and product characteris(
tics, as well as the supply chain structure (level of integration, transparency, will(
ingness to cooperate et cetera). 
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4 Analysis: a preliminary study 
 
 
Experience from previous research (Wijnands et al., 2007) has already contrib(
uted to a general insight in the interdependencies between legislation, informa(
tion obligations (leading to administrative costs) and food safety requirements, 
innovativeness and competitive performance. A further analysis of the data 
gathered in 2006, using partial least squares (PLS) has revealed the following 
interdependencies: 
(  predictability and clearness of food legislation is significantly related to the 
instalment of (mandatory) safety and private quality systems (SAFPRIV); 
(  size (SZ) is significantly related to the predictability and clearness of food 
legislation (PREDCL); in other words, larger companies are better informed 
than smaller; this proofs the point that SMEs possibly have more problems 
in assessing the impact of legislative changes than large companies; 
(  the content (CON) of European food law is negatively related to its innova(
tiveness (INN); in other words, European food law obstructs innovativeness; 
also the model proves that the quality of content of law (CON) provokes 
lower burdens to the companies (ADM); 
(  administrative requirements (ADM) are positively related to obligatory and 
private safety systems (SAFPRIV); 
(  administrative requirements are negatively associated with export perform(
ance outside the EU (EXPO), while also is shown that systems (SAFPRIV) im(
prove such exporting capabilities. 
 
 It is revealed that administrative burdens are substantially caused by regula(
tion in general, and specifically by systems which are deployed to come up to 
safety and hygiene requirements. Further analysis showed that inside the EU a 
level(playing field is created and no significant effects are discernable. Compa(
nies that assess the quality of EU(food law as good, score low on innovation, or 
vice versa (Bremmers et al., submitted). The question remains, and is subject of 
further study, whether such generic relationships also apply to the dairy sector, 
what the role is of labelling in the picture, and what specifics within the dairy 
chain possibly bring different colours in the picture for dairy industry.  
 31 
5 Data gathering process and results 
 
 
We addressed a survey questionnaire to micro, small and medium(sized as well 
as large enterprises:  
1. micro(enterprises: < 10 employees or < €2 million turnover or balance 
sheet total; 
2. small and medium(sized enterprises: between 10 and <250 employees or 
between €2 and < €50 million turnover or €< 43 balance sheet total; 
3. large enterprises: above 250 employees or < €50 million turnover or €< 
43 balance sheet total. 
 
 Dairy firms were addressed in The Netherlands, France, Germany, UK, Italy, 
Poland; for benchmark reasons also Brazil and the US were involved. To ensure 
a sufficient level of response, we sent a survey to members of each sub(group. 
For each participating country 100(200 addresses were selected. A survey (see 
appendix) was composed, which included questions on: 
( company characteristics; 
( food safety and quality systems; 
( innovation; 
( strategy; 
( information capabilities; 
( administrative burdens (compliance costs); 
( competitiveness; 
( transparency (labelling in the food supply chain). 
 
 Despite additional efforts to improve the response rate (telephone calls to 
more than 300 firms in The Netherlands, France, UK and US, second mailing to 
France, involvement of research institutes/universities in Germany, Italy and 
Brazil), the response remains low upon till now (20 June 2008). Included in this 
report are 34 valid cases (companies) of a total response of about 60. Conclu(
sions on the hypothesised relationships are included in the next sections. They 
are a result of a combination of literature search and responses on the ques(
tionnaire.  
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5.1 Baseline results 
 
Although further analysis will be based on more firms, the present document 
addresses 34 companies. Their home country is given in table 5.1 (1 company 
did not reveal its origin). 
 
Table 5.1 Origin of respondents 
Netherlands 12 
France 6 
Poland 1 
UK Europe 6 
Italy 3 
Germany 5 
Total  33 
Missing 1 
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N=34. 
 
 The average size of the companies included in the data is 9838 on average, 
with a STD of 48162, which indicates a big spread in the size of the companies.  
The main products the companies make are hard cheeses (29% of production 
total on average), soft cheeses (27.8%), drinking milk (12.52%) and deserts 
(7.9%). On average, 58.48% of all production and sales are meant for other 
companies, while 21.31% is meant for consumers and 6.46% for internal deliv(
eries. The number of food safety & quality systems (FSQSs) which are certified 
are given in table 5.2.  
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Table 5.2 Available certified FSQSs 
Number of firms Number of systems % 
0 5 20 
1 7 28 
2 4 16 
3 4 16 
4 2 8 
5 2 8 
10 1 4 
Total 25 100 
Missing 9  
 34  
 
 
5.2 Innovation and administrative burdens 
 
The first research question was: what is the relationship between administrative 
burdens, innovation and competitiveness? 
 The relationship of administrative burdens and innovation is twofold. On the 
one side administrative burdens distract resources so that less assets are 
available to innovate. On the other side, innovation itself can be a source of ad(
ministrative burdens. To start with the second effect, market entrance is limited 
through heavy legal requirements such as pre(market approval (which is espe(
cially the case with additives, sweeteners, GMO(related food, supplements, 
novel and functional foods, as well as novel packaging and enzymes). These 
tendencies work to the disadvantage of the innovativeness of SMEs, who lack 
the resources to come up to strict legal requirements. Process innovations are 
necessary to increase efficiency in a globalising market. For SMEs innovation 
takes the character of combining new impulses with existing skills and routines 
(Gielen et al., 2003). 
 The causes for existing administrative burdens and drain of resources, are 
vested in required systems to guard for food related diseases and food quality. 
We argue, that administrative burdens can impede on innovation, since scarce 
resources are used to come up to legal requirements for food safety and qual(
ity. Such improvements will often be 'hidden': consumers cannot experience dif(
ferences in safety and quality ex ante, but only ex post, after having 
bought/consumes the product. We proposed that innovation is related to com(
pany strategy. Possibly, a cost orientation (by for instance improving processes) 
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is more in line with a policy of food safety system implementation than a policy 
of flexibility and product change.  
 To investigate the strategy that the companies apply, we asked a question 
(13), investigating whether the product is adjusted to local taste (multi(domestic 
strategy) or whether a global strategy is used. Moreover, we tried to distinct the 
defenders (in line with a low cost strategy) from the prospectors (differentiation 
strategy; aiming at high quality).  
 
Figure 5.1  Strategic orientation of companies 
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7(point scale; N=30; 1 = low/not appropriate, 7 = high/appropriate. This note also applies to the survey re(
sults presented in the next figures. 
 
 We conclude that companies in the European dairy industry focus more on 
high quality than on low cost, which is in line with the innovative character of the 
subsector. Adjustment to local taste (a multi(domestic strategy) will be applied 
more by small companies than by the big ones. The data show no significant 
correlation in this respect however. To investigate the kind of innovation that 
was applied, the following question (10) concerned a further categorisation of 
innovation from a Schumpeterian viewpoint: 
 35 
 
Our innovation focuses on modification of the product we make 
Our innovation focuses on improving processes of our operations 
Our innovation focuses on developing new markets 
Our innovation focuses on organisation  
(cooperation, licensing, patenting, merging) 
Our innovation focuses on developing and acquiring new raw materials 
 
 The response of 17 valid cases in this respect, shows the following output.  
 
Figure 5.2  Innovation categorisation 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Product  change
Process change
Market  dev elopment
Renew al management  &
organisat ion
Dev elopment  of  raw
mat erial
MEAN SD
 
 
7(point scale; N = 18(25. 
 
 It can be observed that product development scores highest in the range of 
innovation options. This is in line with the idea of a highly innovative subsector. 
What then are the impediments of innovation in this sub(sector? To assess the 
impediments for innovation, we asked (12) to indicate to which extent the com(
pany feels restricted in innovation by the food legislation that applies to it: 
( traceability requirements; 
( HACCP requirements (Hygiene Regulations); 
( Novel Food and/or GMO Regulations; 
( labelling requirements; 
( administration (such as bookkeeping) requirements; 
( other mandatory food safety and/or quality system requirements. 
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Figure 5.3  Innovation barriers 
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7(point scale; N = 21(26. 
 
 Figure 5.3 shows that labelling requirements are a serious threat to innova(
tion, as well as (second) administrative requirements. This is in line with our 
theoretical framework. Companies which are more innovative will perceive to be 
hampered more by bureaucratic structures.  
 The introduction of private labels could have a negative effect on innovation. 
In 2005 in Great Britain and Italy the greatest share of household income was 
spent on private label products (AC Nielsen, 2005, p. 24). Especially in refriger(
ated food (milk, yogurt, butter/margarine, cheese et cetera) private label takes 
a major share of overall value. As to AC Nielsens's Executive News Report, for 
milk the private label share in 2005 was 43%, for cheese 33%, and for but(
ter/margarine 21%, for yogurt 15% (ACNielsen, 2005 p. 14), while the price dif(
ferential between private label and manufacturer brands are big (between 10% ( 
48%).  
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5.3 Administrative burdens and food safety and quality system deployment 
 
The second research question was: what is the relationship between administra(
tive burdens, food safety & quality deployment and competitiveness? 
 On average, the respondents have 3.1 FSQSs, of which an average of 2.2 
are certified. This implicates a certification rate of 70%. We asked questions 
about the perceived helpfulness of food safety and quality systems to comply 
(9). We asked: do you consider the following food safety and quality system X to 
be helpful in complying with food legislation for your local company? The results 
are shown in figure 5.4. 
 
Figure 5.4  Level of support for compliance 
 
7(point scale; N=17(23. 
 
 It appears that especially certified HACCP is considered of primary impor(
tance for compliance; this is not surprising, since HACCP is an obligatory sys(
tem in the dairy industry. Also retailer systems (like BRC) score high. This 
expresses the positive aspects of supply chain integration: it takes away re(
sponsibilities with respect to compliance from the shoulders of the (smaller) up(
stream producers to a degree, and centralises administrative burdens.  
 While compliance using FSQSs is a defensive strategy, we also asked ques(
tions about the ( from a strategic perspective ( positive aspects of such sys(
tems. If taking measures to enhance food safety would be regarded ( in effect( 
as a burden, why then would such requirements be undertaken on a voluntary 
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basis? To investigate the reason for introducing food safety and quality systems 
we asked the following question (8). We asked an answer to the following ques(
tions: 
( we have got FSQS because governmental agencies ask for it; 
( we have got FSQS because buyers ask for it; 
( we demand FSQS from our suppliers; 
( we have got FSQS to distinguish ourselves from competitors. 
 The results are as in Figure 5.5. 
 
Figure 5.5  Reasons for installing FSQSs 
 
7(point scale; N = 24(25. 
 
 The overriding argument for installing food safety and quality systems are 
not governmental demands, but customer wishes. This is in line with the own 
demands companies make towards their suppliers. However, some respondents 
commented the great diversity of systems and standards between EU(countries. 
This will, as a consequence, have a negative impact on export performance. We 
investigated the effects of food safety and quality regulations. Did tightening 
norms increase administrative burdens (17)? We asked whether such regulations 
have led in the past three years to: 
( efforts to implement food safety and quality systems; 
( information gathering costs about the content of law; 
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( information processing costs to inform governmental organisations; 
( information processing costs to buyers of the product. 
 
 The statistical results are as in Figure 5.6. 
 
Figure 5.6  Effects of food legislation 
 
7(point scale; N=30. 
 
 Figure 5.6 illustrates that on the one side administrative FSQS activities have 
increased, but on the other side increased costs have to be made to provide 
the necessary documentation. Figure 5.5 shows, that FSQSs are provoked at 
least by two parties: demands from legislation and demands from customers 
(especially in b(to(b transactions).  
 The obligatory introduction of HACCP certification will cause relatively higher 
adjustment costs in SMEs than the impact this legislation will have in large or(
ganisations. HACCP places burdens on SMEs because of documentation, valida(
tion and verification requirement (Taylor, 2001). Barriers for SMEs for smooth 
HACCP(implementation are the lack of skills, training and technical expertise as 
well as lack of time and money (Taylor, 2001). On the other hand, benefits can 
be discerned which can be depicted as market(driven (enhanced reputation et 
cetera) or supply(side driven (improvements in efficiency, see Henson and Holt, 
2000). Other benefits are increased focus in the organisation, team(building, as 
well as legal protection (Taylor, 2001). The perceived importance of HACCP and 
its benefits towards customers which are discerned on the basis of the empiri(
cal material underlines this statement.  
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5.3.1 Labelling and administrative burdens 
 
The third research question was: what is the relationship between administrative 
burdens, food labelling requirements and competitiveness? 
 For several reasons, labelling can induce a premium on the price to the pro(
ducer: 
( product characteristics and improvements in general transparent to the pub(
lic, so that ( depending on the willingness to pay ( a premium on the price is 
harvested; 
( at the cost side labelling reduces the information(gathering costs to the buy(
er. 
 
 In general, changes in labelling requirements can lead to additional costs: 
design of new packaging, information overload to the consumer (problems to 
digest extra information on the package) and subsequently loss of effect, infor(
mation gathering costs with respect to form and content et cetera  
 A premium is harvested, if labelling contributes to the value of a brand. The 
value of a brand/label can be measured by discounting the extra cash flows 
which are generated through the better image or reputation of the firm(s) behind 
the brand. A brand value is economically expressed as the value of an image 
and/or reputation. Image expresses the public's short(run beliefs, while a repu(
tation is more durable (Marwick and Fill, 1997 in: Berthon et al., 2008).  
 
5.3.2 Mark(of(origin ('EU') label 
 
Mark(of(origin labelling is recognised as a source for improved competitive per(
formance if such labelling designates superior quality and/or safety. Probably 
especially in internal communal trade, mark(of(origin labelling renders no signifi(
cant contribution to welfare. In international business relationships it can have a 
definite function, especially to those countries that lack superior quality and/or 
safety levels: reading frequency of food labels appears to be dependent on the 
degree of uncertainty about the food supply (Wandel, 1997). In an extensive 
study of the USDA ('Mandatory country of origin labelling of imported muscle 
cuts of beef and lamb') to assess the acceptability of labelling imports from out(
side the USA, only US farmers supported the idea, supposing that the consumer 
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would better be able to discriminate between home(made and foreign(made 
product and thus buy more own produce. Golan et al. 2001 suggest that the 
costs of origin labelling exceed the benefits, which is in line with other studies 
(for instance: Blank, 1998, in Golan et al., 2001). The question for any manda(
tory labelling system is whether it is effective enough to cover the extra admin(
istrative costs. 
 
'Clearly, mandatory labelling will not be effective if it is not accompanied by consistent, 
achievable standards, testing services (or IP), certification services, and enforcement. In 
fact, labelling requirements in the absence of these services have more potential to dis(
rupt the market than they do to reduce transaction costs. For example the inconsistent 
manner in which EU tolerance levels have been applied has increased uncertainty and in(
formation and search costs. In many cases, food manufacturers are uncertain how best 
to comply with EU standards and ensure access to the European market.' 
Golan et al. (2001) 
 
 Origin labelling, just like any kind of economic labelling or branding, will be 
preferable if consumers are diverse; only in that case price differences will oc(
cur and information has a value added to the consumer. For producers that 
want to distinguish themselves from competitors, homogeneity of product sug(
gested by a label like 'made in the EU' is not preferable since such labelling 
hides quality differences instead of exposing them. In addition to the question(
able advantages of origin labelling, an abundant amount of questions have to be 
asked, most of them contributing to information burdens (either for public in(
cluding EU authorities, or for private firms trying to comply. As an example the 
questions surrounding GMO labelling are exposed in table 5.3. 
 The question is not so much whether origin labelling increases administrative 
burdens (it will, in a voluntary system by controlling those companies that com(
mit themselves to a labelling system, and in a compulsory systems by increase 
of monitoring and control costs) but whether origin labelling costs are lower 
than the advantages that can be expected (in the form of extra value added 
and/or sales). Those advantages are, on logical grounds assessed to be mea(
gre. 
  Regarding export performance they could be harvested at three levels: 
( intra(communal; 
( EU(US; 
( EU(lower developed countries. 
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Table 5.3 Effects of labelling 
Policy ques9
tions 
Policy options Probable effect 
on administrative 
burdens legal au9
thorities 
 
Probable effect on 
administrative bur9
dens private firms 
How are genetic 
engineering, ge(
netic modifica(
tion, or 
biotechnology 
defined? 
Broadly 
By specific tech(
niques used 
+/( 
+ 
+/( 
+ 
Is program vol(
untary or manda(
tory 
Voluntary 
Mandatory 
+ 
+ 
+/0 
+ 
Which products 
are covered? 
All food products 
Only key food 
products 
Only certain food 
categories 
+ 
+/0 
 
+/0 
+ 
+/0 
 
+/0 
Which ingredi(
ents are cov(
ered? 
 
All ingredients 
Only most impor(
tant ingredients 
All ingredients 
except preserva(
tives, additives et 
cetera 
 
+ 
+/0 
 
 
+/0 
+/0 
+ 
+/0 
 
 
+/0 
+/0 
When are label(
ling require(
ments triggered? 
X% of product is 
GM 
Most important 
ingredients are 
GM 
Important charac(
teristics are al(
tered 
+ 
 
+/0 
 
 
+/0 
+ 
 
+/0 
 
 
+/0 
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Table 5.3 Effects of labelling (continue) 
Policy ques9
tions 
Policy options Probable effect 
on administrative 
burdens legal au9
thorities 
 
Probable effect on 
administrative bur9
dens private firms 
How are prod(
ucts made from 
animals fed with 
GM inputs han(
dled? 
Labelling required 
if feed is GM 
Labelling not re(
quired if feed is 
GM 
+ 
 
0 
+ 
 
0 
How are restau(
rant, take(out, 
bulk, and institu(
tional foods han(
dled? 
Included in label(
ling requirements 
Excluded from la(
belling require(
ments 
+ 
 
 
0 
+ 
 
 
0 
What label state(
ments must/can 
be made 
Does contain 
GMOs (genetically 
modified) 
May contain 
GMOs  
Non(GMO 
Does not contain 
GMOs 
+ 
 
 
+/( 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
 
+/( 
 
+ 
+ 
How are compa(
nies required to 
verify GM status? 
Self(certification 
by seller is ac(
ceptable 
Testing 
Third(party certi(
fication 
0 
 
 
+ 
0 
+/( 
 
 
+ 
+ 
Source: Adapted and extended from: J.A. Caswell ( Labelling Policy for GMOs: To Each HisOown? AgBioForum 
Vol. 3, No 1, 2000 pp. 53(57. 
 
 It can be stated that only with respect to the third category an improved 
competitive advantage can be expected. While intra(communally a label 'Made in 
the European Union' hides differences in quality and safety levels and therefore 
possibly works counter(productive, in the EU and the US a level playing field has 
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been established by the development of global instead of regional standards for 
food safety.  
 
5.3.3 Co(labelling and private labels 
 
Private labels and labels of producer's brands serve similar functions as food 
labels: they inform about the characteristics of the product and the supply chain 
behind it. Co(labelling (printing the producer's name on the package) is one of 
the possible options to create chain transparency. First we investigated the level 
of transparency of the supply chain to the customer (23). The questions were: 
( Our name as processor is clearly visible on the package of the final product; 
( The origin of the raw material/ingredients in the product is clearly visible on 
the package of the final product.  
 
Figure 5.7  Effects of co9labelling 
 
7(point scale; N = 27(29. 
 
 The visibility of the company name on the package of the final product 
scored on average 4.76 (N=25) with a wide spread (STD = 2.350). It depends 
on the position in the supply chain whether the company name is mentioned. 
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The visibility of the raw material included in the end(product was evaluated 
lower: 3.80 (STD = 2.43; N =25). 
 Next we asked what effect is expected from improved transparency through 
origin labelling (25): 
 ( a much lower (1) ( much higher (7) profit margin; 
 ( much lower (1) ( much higher (7) exports; 
 ( much lower (1) ( much higher (7) turnover. 
 
 The results appeared to be mediocre (see figure 5.7). 
 
 It appears that the companies in the sample on average do not expect 
strong positive effects of increased chain transparency. Standpoints will logi(
cally be very diverse Retailers which already express their own company name 
on the package will oppose, while producers upstream will possibly see the 
benefits of the system. Private label holders will clearly oppose, because men(
tioning producer's brands on the package is contrary to the intentions of private 
labelling. There are also technical reasons for opposing to a system of co(
labelling: 
( often there are many contributors to the end(product; if this is the case, in(
creased transparency will lead progressively to information processing 
costs; 
( under such circumstances the costs of monitoring and control will be exorbi(
tant; 
( the delineation of which producers are mentioned on the label (defining the 
scope) will, under conditions of a multitude or co(processors, be only real(
ised at great cost; 
( even if the input for the end(product is homogeneous, it could be that there 
are a multitude of (small) suppliers; the costs for the end(producer would be 
exorbitant. 
 
 If, however, such transparency should be realised, it can be done by means 
of: 
( an obligation to mention the name of the producers upstream; 
( giving a producer upstream to claim that his name will be put on the pack(
age; 
( facilitating the end(producer to mention the names of suppliers on the pack(
age. 
 
 Figure 5.8 shows the results. 
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Figure 5.8  Options for co9labelling 
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7(point scale; N=28(29. 
 
 There appears to be not much support on average, but standard deviations 
are very high. Preferences within the dairy industry are, as mentioned, possibly 
dependent on the actual circumstances and position in the supply chain a com(
pany takes in. On the one hand, co(labelling increases administrative costs to 
the end(producer/retailer that brings the product to the market as well as to 
governmental agencies which in a voluntary system would specify the form and 
in an obligatory system would enforce and monitor implementation. On the other 
hand, possibly it would improve the position of SMEs in the consumer market. 
We discerned a negative, but non(significant relationship between size (person(
nel) and the preference of a system that installs the obligation to print the name 
of producers upstream the supply chain on the package. 
 The increased visibility can provide a premium on the price which can be har(
vested by either the retailer or the producer (SME), depending on the power re(
lations. The outcome of the bargaining process is highly unpredictable and 
depends on: the number of suppliers from which the retailer/end(producer can 
choose, the level of product differentiation (homogeneous products (commodi(
ties) will possibly meet high competition and so the premium which is rendered 
is relatively low), the level of dependency (alternative market channels available 
to the producer(SME and the retailer(seller), level of transparency of product(
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characteristics to the consumer and the number of suppliers with the same or 
similar products to choose from.  
 In case of: a homogeneous product with alternative supply channel (com(
modity) administrative burdens for the enterprises as well as for governmental 
agencies will possibly outweigh the benefits from increased transparency of the 
supply chain. Summarising our viewpoint, the following table can be used to as(
sess the policy alternatives. A distinction has been made between SMEs that: 
(  deliver their product directly to the consumer(market and SMEs that deliver 
their product via a second organisation (for instance a retailer). Within this 
last category a further distinction can (among other) be made between situa(
tions in which: 
 ( the SME's product is a component of the end(product of the end(
 producer/retailer; 
 ( the SME's product is sold in its original state by the retailer and meets 
the competition of other (including the retailer's) products; 
 ( the SME's product is sold under private label by the end(
producer/retailer. 
(  SMEs that make a commodity or make a differentiated product. A commod(
ity is defined as a homogeneous product which is produced by many suppli(
ers. 
 
With respect to the economic effects of private labelling in general, Bergès(Sennou et al. 
(2008) make a distinction between the short run and the long run. As to the authors, a 
positive impact on total welfare is suggested (although a redistribution of profits in the 
supply chain can be expected). In the long term 'the impact of PL could well be less posi(
tive. The argument is as follows: 
 
'The development of PLs leads to a different share of profits within vertical struc(
tures. A decrease in the profits of the upstream producers could lead to less innova(
tion and thus reduce the variety of goods available to the consumers. This 
mechanism is reinforced by the strategy of retailers who develop 'me(too' products. 
This strategy is nothing more than free(riding on research and development of new 
products. Such free(riding will discourage the efforts devoted to the development of 
new products in the long term.' 
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Figure 5.9 Product characteristics and chain transparency 
Supply chain position of SME 
producer  
Product  
characteristics 
Policy alternative 
SME delivers directly to the  
consumer(market 
Commodity  Upscaling to reduce costs and in 
this way avoiding entrance to the 
market; this process will enrol 
naturally in a competing market; 
no reason for intervention. Need 
for process innovations 
 
SME's product is a component  
of the end(product of the  
end(producer/retailers 
Commodity Upscaling to reduce costs and in 
this way avoiding entrance to the 
market; this process will enrol 
naturally in a competing market; 
no reason for intervention. Need 
for process innovations.  
SME's product is sold in its  
original state by the retailer 
and meets competition 
Differentiated product Stimulation of product innova(
tions, for instance by facilitating 
the access of new products to 
the market.  
SME's product is sold under  
private label 
Commodity Reduction of costs via process 
innovations; natural tendency to 
upscaling; competition will  
reduce the number of SMEs.  
SME's product is sold under  
private label 
Differentiated product Craftmanship of SME is hidden 
and premium not collected. Co(
labelling can re(arrange the dis(
tribution of the value added in the 
supply chain. Label of the SME 
producer should be mentioned 
on the package. Preference of a 
voluntary system; SME has 
power to enforce co(labelling.  
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 In cases of a commodity the net(effect of co(labelling will most likely be 
negative: administrative burdens will increase, while the advantages are limited; 
economically there is no reason to enforce enhanced chain transparency. In 
case of a differentiated product, co(labelling is one alternative for strengthening 
the position of SMEs. However, in case co(labelling has a function, SMEs are in 
many cases also strong enough to create competitive advantages themselves. 
 The effects of private labels on administrative burdens, looking at the EU as 
a whole, are expected to be positive, because of upscaling.  
 
 
5.4 Administrative burdens and transparency 
 
The fourth research question is: what is the relationship between administrative 
burdens, supply chain transparency and competitiveness?  
 We have asked ourselves in the previous paragraph what the significance is 
of increased transparency in the supply chain. Additionally, we gathered empiri(
cal information on the transparency of legal rules to the companies. We asked a 
question concerning the clearness of the rules that apply to the company, now 
and in the future. We investigated whether the legislation that is significant to 
the company is clear and predictable (14). We submitted the following state(
ments to the companies: 
( we are well informed about the food legislation that applies to our local 
company; 
( we have a well(developed information system to comply to information re(
quirements; 
( we are well informed about upcoming food legislation that is relevant for our 
 company. 
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Figure 5.10  Level of informedness 
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7(point scale; N=30. 
 
 In general, companies are well informed about the present and upcoming 
legislation that applies to their business unit. This result is in line with the out(
comes of the competitiveness study of Wijnands et al., 2007. Companies indi(
cate they have a more than average developed information system, and are 
reasonably well able to predict future food regulation developments. We remind 
that the fact that companies indicate that they are well informed, does not prove 
they know the rules. 
 Transparency in the food chain concerns, among others, the relationship be(
tween retailer and producer. However, empirical work about producer(retailer re(
lationships is rare (Berges(Sennou et al., 2008) . Lack of clearness and 
transparency will invoke SMEs to mimicry the behaviour of larger organisations 
in their sector. However, SMEs are less well informed than bigger companies. 
We combined the results on the level of informedness with a size measure (per(
sonnel). The results show, that in general bigger companies indicate to be bet(
ter informed about the present state of regulatory requirements, and have more 
certified food safety and quality systems at their disposal.  
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Table 5.5 Correlation Personnel x Informedness 
 
 
2Personnel 14 We are well 
informed 
2Personnel Correlation Coefficient 
Sig. (2(tailed) 
N 
1.000 
. 
34 
.438* 
.016 
 30 
Spear(
man's 
rho 
14 We are well 
informed 
Correlation Coefficient 
Sig. (2(tailed) 
N 
.438* 
.016 
 30 
1.000 
. 
 30 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2(tailed). 
 
 Non(parametric Spearman's rho (personnel x informedness) shows 0.438 (p 
< 0.05 two(tailed). The significance of this is that they are better able to monitor 
the impact of new requirements or evaluate the impact of changes. However, 
innovative SMEs possibly require managerial flexibility which is hampered by in(
ternal procedures in bureaucratic systems.  
 A distinction should be made between those organisations that are heavily 
embedded, i.e., will copy procedures and rely on safety systems to reduce li(
ability and conform to market standards, and companies that act on a 'stand(
alone'(basis. Companies that already have systems like ISO or certified HACCP 
available, will absorb new legal requirements with more ease than companies 
which do dispose of such systems. Safety systems reduce organisational flexi(
bility. Highly product(innovative companies, however, will rely on a flexible atti(
tude towards the market and put efforts in R&D to change basic product 
characteristics. Such companies will regard governmental interference and pre(
scriptions that impede on flexibility as burdensome. In the US, barriers to mar(
ket entrance are lower because of a fundamental different way of governing 
newly developed food and foodstuffs. As elaborated in Wijnands et al. (2007), 
the legal culture in the US is more repressive compared with Europe, while the 
European food culture is preventive of a kind. It is a matter of moral and political 
choice to make shifts on the scale of repressive ( preventive food legislation. 
While the US is shifting gradually towards a more preventive system, the EU is 
holding its position and trying to reduce the extra (prevention) costs a preven(
tive policy requires. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
52 
5.5 Administrative burdens and competitiveness of the diary industry 
 
To investigate the net impact and acceptability of administrative burdens we 
asked to indicate the extent to which: 
( the administrative burdens caused by food legislation are warranted by the 
increased food safety and quality that is achieved; 
( a further Increase of administrative burdens is acceptable if this increases 
food safety and quality; 
( a decrease in food safety is acceptable if it decreases the administrative 
burdens; 
( the benefits caused by food legislation outweigh the administrative burdens 
this legislation provokes. 
 
 We obtained 27 valid cases of European companies in the dairy food sector. 
The statistics are included in the following figure. 
 
Figure 5.11  Safety level and administrative burdens 
 
7(point scale; N=28(30. 
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 Although there are only a limited amount of cases, the results are in line with 
the 2007 study on competitiveness in general of the food industry (Wijnands et 
al., 2007. They oppose to further increase of administrative loads, but are not 
willing to sacrifice food safety to reduce compliance costs. 
 
 
5.6 Overall assessment of quality of legislation 
 
We asked an overall judgment on the quality of the European food industry legis(
lation. First we tried to find out which legal environment is preferred (21): EU 
USA, Brazil or a different legal environment. For European countries the statisti(
cal results are as follows: 
 
Figure 5.12  Preference legal system of European dairy companies 
 
7(point scale; N = 22(24. 
 
 The results show the European dairy companies in general prefer the Euro(
pean legal environment over for instance the USA (mean = 3.88 vs 2.20 on a 7(
point scale). Last we asked the companies to provide a mark for the food legis(
lation which applies to the own company. We asked: 'The food legislation which 
applies to our own company is good'.  
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Figure 5.13  Assessment of quality of EU food legislation 
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7(point scale; N=25. 
 
 The EU food legislation scores on average 4.68 on a 7(point scale (STD = 
1.558, N=34), which is in line with the positive picture of the EUFI(I report  
(Wijnands et al., 2007). 
 
 
5.7 Control variables 
 
In the previous pages, we already paid attention to the influence of size and 
network on administrative burdens and competitiveness. Here we pay attention 
to the supply chain specifics and its change over time. Supply chains are not 
static. The change in supply chain structure refers to changes in the contacts 
between consumers and retailers/companies, which affect previous stages in 
the supply chain. The special position and policy alternatives to enhance innova(
tiveness in SMEs are elaborated upon below. A major impact is vested in the 
fact that consumers buy more and more dairy products under private label (AC 
Nielsen, 2005). This has several consequences: 
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( a shift and change of administrative burdens within the supply chain; 
( indirect contact with the end(market for a part of total production of SME(
processors; 
( competition of branded products with private label produce via the same 
outlet: the chain participant which created the private label in the first place. 
 
 According to the European Commission 'Small and medium(sized enter(
prises are the backbone of the European economy, and the most important 
creators of new jobs and economic growth' (European Commission, 2007). The 
European commission mentions the administrative burden as a main drawback 
for SMEs. Reasons for protecting SMEs are connected to their economic 
and/or social functions. The two questions cannot be treated apart from each 
other. Several (combined) reasons are mentioned for this: 
( they are sources of innovation; 
( they employ a large part of the productive population; 
( they account for the majority of companies in the EU; 
( they have characteristics which big companies lack: they are flexible, di(
verse, experienced in traditional food production et cetera; 
( they are more flexible and this combined with innovativeness makes them 
better able to serve niche markets (Berthon, 2008). 
 
 While SMEs excel in innovativeness, traditional production and diversity, food 
safety concerns, labelling and other legal requirements will favour large versus 
small companies: 
( standardised production is more easily to control and monitor; 
( it can be sold under one label, thus bridging the differences between more 
than one processor for a specified end(product; 
( it is more easily to market (advertising) and to build an image of trustworthi(
ness; 
( burdens of innovation are easily copied by large producers and private la(
bels, if legal protection is not formalised (SMEs do not excel in creating bar(
riers to copying behaviour; on the other hand, with respect to processes and 
procedures they are convicted to copy, to reduce costs and administrative 
burdens).  
 
 SMEs are threatened by supply chain structure change: 
( required homogeneity/standardised output, to come up to legal (food safety) 
as well as market demands (sales at large scale via (store) brands = private 
labels);  
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( lack of transparency of improved quality towards the consumer through le(
gally prescribed or enforced by retail companies for instance (and not being 
able to collect a premium because of improved product characteristics as a 
result of complying to legal requirements) because of the structure of the 
supply chain (indirect sales via deliveries to retail chains et cetera); 
( shifts in the distribution of the premium which is harvested because of posi(
tive buyer effects through structural changes in the supply chain. 
 
 As elaborated in the adjacent study on legal impediments on innovativeness 
of food companies by Van der Meulen (2008), SMEs are hampered in their com(
petitiveness by pre(market approval schemes on GMO, functional foods and  
 
Table 5.6 Starting a new firm 
Country Administrative 
complexity 
Lack of financial 
support 
Risk tolerance 
Austria 0.683 0.732 0.433 
Belgium 0.799 0.819 0.467 
Denmark 0.846 0.758 0.596 
Finland 0.711 0.651 0.558 
France 0.822 0.859 0.597 
Germany 0.761 0.805 0.504 
Greece 0.762 0.892 0.534 
Ireland 0.731 0.751 0.736 
Italy 0.810 0.873 0.546 
Luxemburg 0.754 0.815 0.496 
Netherlands 0.655 0.590 0.519 
Portugal 0.869 0.880 0.410 
Spain 0.768 0.835 0.569 
Sweden 0.819 0.843 0.464 
United Kingdom 0.721 0.709 0.663 
Iceland 0.544 0.692 0.547 
Norway 0.761 0.613 0.356 
United States 0.685 0.780 0.711 
Weighted average 0.745 0.777 0.544 
Source: Van Stel and Stunnenberg (2004), p. 8; original; Flash Eurobarometer 134 and 146 (average 2002 
and 2003), European Commission.  
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additive regulations. Especially regulations 258/97 (Novel Foods and Novel 
Food Ingredients) as well as 1829/2003 on genetically modified food increase 
the time(to(market of new findings; uncertainty exists not only with respect to 
the time schedule but also whether food and/or ingredients are addressed by 
the regulations (the scope; see in detail: Van der Meulen (2008). In an extensive 
study by Krauss and Stahlecker (2001) it was argued for German biotechnology 
firms that barriers were vested in: 
( low impulses to found biotechnology firms out of academic research; 
( bad alignment with the institutional environment; 
( government restraints. 
 
 Administrative complexity has a negative influence on the latent and actual 
inclination to start a new firm (Grilo and Thurik, 2004). The measured impacts 
on starting a business are given in the following table. 
 The table shows that administrative complexity in the US is lower, while risk 
tolerance is higher than in 18 OECD countries. 
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6 Final remarks, conclusions and policy 
 implications 
 
 
The European dairy sector is highly competitive and innovative. However, on a 
world market countries from South(America, Australia and Asia are increasingly 
catching up. We defined a framework using TQM(cost insights and TCE to ex(
press, on theoretical grounds, the effects of regulatory burdens on the competi(
tiveness. we found that problems arising in the food industry as a whole also 
apply to dairy companies. In a discussion with experts from the dairy industry 
some administrative burdens were mentioned in related domains: REACH, the 
regulations on animal by(products (where tracing and tracking is useful for ani(
mals and meat but hard for milk that is collected in batches and cannot easily 
be traced back to the farm), administrative burdens in exports (Achterbos 
(2007) and competition law (cooperation by SMEs). 
 Especially for future growth, the dairy industry will have to operate on the 
world market rather than on the European market, with specialised, innovative 
and distinctive products. Excessive administrative burdens connected with hier(
archical market structure will not be in the interest of the dairy industry. A posi(
tive perception of the form of regulations is strongly related to the size of 
companies. As Doyle proposes (Doyle, 2007), firms should be supported to 
close the gap between regulation dissemination and the translation of such 
regulation in knowledge at the firm level to maintain competitive. Possibilities to 
monitor the level of compliance are limited, so instruments to increase food 
safety should benefit to the producer, so that voluntary compliance is reached. 
In this context it should be noted that external monitoring and inspection can ei(
ther address the outcomes, or can address the established procedures for in(
ternal control (Scrivens, 2007). Monitoring procedures is less costly than 
monitoring outcomes. Especially non( or insufficient compliance could signal a 
need for simplification of the law system (OECD, 2007).  
 Conclusions and advice can be stated as follows. Although companies depict 
areas where EU food law could be simplified and specific areas of regulations 
are seen as burdensome, they have a preference for the European system, 
which puts food safety above ex(post litigation. 
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 A distinction should be made between the form and the content of food law. 
Especially product innovative companies are dissatisfied with the content of 
food law.  
 Time(to(market of new output is long, costs are relatively (compared to the 
US) high, and procedures are intransparent. Legal prescriptions are scattered 
and a comprehensive overview is often lacking (see Van der Meulen (2008) for 
details). 
 European dairy companies are inclined to accept relatively relatively high 
administrative burdens (especially in comparison with the US) for the sake of 
food safety and quality. In other words: they will not choose for a policy that re(
duces administrative burdens at the expense of food safety and quality. 
 The European food law with respect to the dairy industry is evaluated as be(
ing relatively good. Companies in the dairy industry that foster product innova(
tion will be negatively impacted by procedural obligations. However, process 
innovations are stimulated by food law, since systems and procedures have to 
be installed. Companies that foster process innovations will accept administra(
tive requirements more easily than companies that foster product innovations. 
 Policy towards SMEs should be adjusted to their product characteristics and 
supply chain position. The benefits of co(labelling depend on these two vari(
ables. Co(labelling (printing the name on the package of the end(
producer/retailer) is only beneficial (benefits outweigh administrative burdens) if 
the upstream product is differentiated (not easy to copy). For commodities (ho(
mogeneous produce which is supplied by many companies) upscaling in inter(
mediary production stages will be inevitable, to reduce costs. In the long run, 
these SMEs will necessarily merge to enhance economies of scale. Upscaling of 
commodity(production will be to the benefit of efficiency of food supply chains 
and should therefore not be obstructed. 
 EU Origin labelling (a 'made in EU'(label) will hide intra(communal food safety 
and quality differences. The positive side is that it could stimulate exports (es(
pecially to non(western countries). Companies will prefer to distinguish them(
selves on their brand(name, PGI/PDO and food safety and quality 
characteristics. Origin labelling (a ‘made in EU' label) can have a contra(
productive effect, because it hides company( and country(specific differences. 
Moreover, the EU as a whole will be vulnerable should food( or political prob(
lems occur. 
 Food safety and quality systems appeared to be more provoked by cus(
tomer wishes than by legal obligations. So the costs which are connected to 
them would possibly have been made even if food legislations would not impose 
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them. Integration of food safety and quality requirements is necessary to reduce 
monitoring and reporting costs, by private and public parties. 
 In general, there is not a broad preference for increased chain transparency 
through co(labelling, although opinions are very diverse. Technically there are 
strong disadvantages if such transparency should be improved by means of la(
belling, the costs of monitoring and control by public agencies being one of 
them.  
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Appendix 1 
Questionnaire UK: competitiveness of the EU dairy 
industry 
 
 
Research by: 
LEI (Agricultural Economic Research Institute, The Hague), 
 Law & Governance Group and Management Studies Group, WUR 
 
Explanations and remarks 
 
> The goal of this research is to compare the USA, Brazil and 6 European 
countries on their competitiveness, causes of administrative burdens and atti(
tude towards supply chain transparency.  
> Question one about the 'LOCAL COMPANY' fixes the legal environment you 
have in mind when filling in the remaining questions. It is possible to fill in more 
than one questionnaire to address different legal environments. See: 
http://www3.lei.wur.nl/EUfoodindustry for electronic versions of the question(
naire. 
> The results are only analysed and presented in an anonymous way. In no re(
spect will the answers of individual firms be made available to the public. 
> It is very important to be as complete as possible in answering all questions. 
It takes a maximum of 10(15 minutes! 
> If desired, a summary of the results is sent to you by e(mail (fill in your ad(
dress at the end). 
> For further information please contact Jo Wijnands (jo.wijnands@wur.nl), tel 
+31 317 485941 or Harry Bremmers (harry.bremmers@wur.nl), tel. +31 317 
485009. 
 
Would you please be so kind as to answer the following questions. The results 
will be treated confidentially. 
 
Please return the questionnaire to: 
Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI) 
Jo Wijnands 
P.O. Box 29703 
2502 LS The Hague / The Netherlands 
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A. General questions 
 
1. In which country is your company located? 
Please note: in following questions this is called 'LOCAL COMPANY': it fixes the legal 
environment for which you provide the answers. That is why ONLY ONE ANSWER IS 
POSSIBLE!  
 
a. Netherlands  ...... 
b. France  ...... 
c. Poland  ...... 
d. UK (European part) ...... 
e. Italy    ...... 
f. Germany  ...... 
g. USA    ...... 
h. Brazil    ...... 
i. Other (please indicate) …... 
 
2.  
How many people (in full9time jobs, own staff and 
contractors) are currently working in your LOCAL 
COMPANY. Approximately: 
 
 
.......... staff 
What is the turnover of your LOCAL COMPANY? 
Approximately: 
 
.......... € million  
What are the total assets of your LOCAL 
COMPANY? Approximately: 
 
.......... € million 
How many different food safety and/or quality sys9
tems are functioning at your local company? 
 
.......... number of systems 
To what extent (in a percentage) are these systems 
certified? 
 
..........% 
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3.  
What is your local company's position in the food chain? (indicate with 
an estimated percentage of total turnover, adding up to 100%) 
% 
Production and business to business sales    % 
Production and business to consumer sales  % 
Production for internal deliveries within the concern  % 
Sales only, business to business sales */  % 
Sales only, business to consumer sales */  % 
Total is:  100% 
 
 IF YOUR ANSWER IS 'SALES ONLY' THEN GO TO QUESTION 13 (skip 4912) 
4. 
What product(s) does your LOCAL COMPANY produce (indicate 
with an estimated percentage of total turnover of your local company, 
adding up to 100%)? 
%  
Fresh drinking milk   
........ 
% 
Soft cheese(s)  
....... 
% 
Semi(hard and hard cheese(s)  
........ 
% 
Desserts   
........ 
% 
Milk powder  
........ 
% 
Ingredients and/or food supplements   
........ 
% 
Butter  
........ 
% 
 
Other dairy (name?).................................................... 
 
........ 
 
% 
 
Other non(dairy (name?).............................................. 
 
........ 
 
% 
Total is.................... 100 % 
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5.  
Indicate the percentage of sales achieved with exports of your 
local company in a percentage of its total turnover 
 
...... 
 
% 
Indicate the quantity of imported inputs of your local company 
(raw material, ingredients and/or semi9finished products) for 
your production in a percentage of total inputs 
 
 
...... 
 
% 
 
6.  
How can your sold products be characterised?  
(encircle the appropriate answer) 
1 = Not at all; 4 = half of 
our production; 7 = whole 
production 
We produce a recognised consumer brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
We produce a final product for a private label owner 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
We produce a semi(final (intermediate) product for a proc(
essor  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
We produce a legally Protected Designation of Origin/ 
Geographical Indication/ 
country of origin label, or similar 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Our product is protected by a trade mark 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
We produce a final product for consumers under our own 
company name 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
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7. 
 With respect to your local company 
 Where does the 
raw material you 
use originate 
from? 
Where is the 
product you sell 
or transfer made 
in? 
What is the des9
tination of your 
product? 
EU country ........% ........% ........% 
Brazil ........% ........% ........% 
The USA ........% ........% ........% 
Other Developed 
countries 
........% ........% ........% 
Other Newly Industri(
alised countries (NIC) 
........% ........% ........% 
Less developed coun(
tries 
........% ........% ........% 
Total raw material  100 % 100% 100% 
 
B. AVAILABLE FOOD SAFETY/QUALITY SYSTEMS 
 
8.  
Please answer the following questions on your FSQS = 
food safety and quality systems (encircle the appro9
priate answer) 
1 = totally disagree; 4 
=neutral; 7 totally agree  
We have FSQS because governmental agencies ask for it 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
We have FSQS because buyers ask for it 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We demand FSQS from our suppliers  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We have FSQS to distinguish ourselves from competitors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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9. 
Do you consider the following food safety and 
quality systems to be helpful in complying with 
food legislation for your local company: 
1 = not helpful at all 
4 = neutral; 7 = very helpful  
NA = does not apply to our com(
pany 
Certified HACCP system NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ISO food quality system NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Systems demanded by retailers (like 
BRC/GlobalGap)  
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
IFS (International Food Standard) NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
SQF (Safe Quality Food) NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
other  
(fill in:...............................................................)? 
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
C. INNOVATION 
 
10.  
Indicate to what extent the following state9
ments apply to your local company (encircle 
the appropriate answer): 
 
 
 
1 = not at all; 4 = neutral 
7 = to a large extent ; N 
= not applicable to our 
company 
Our innovation focuses on modification of the prod(
uct we make 
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our innovation focuses on improving processes of 
our operations 
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our innovation focuses on developing new markets NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our innovation focuses on organisation (coopera(
tion, licensing, patenting, merging) 
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our innovation focuses on developing and acquiring 
new raw materials 
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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11. 
Indicate to which extent your local company 
feels restricted in innovation by the food legisla(
tion that applies to your local company: 
 1 = totally disagree; 7 
=totally agree NA = does 
not apply to our company  
( Traceability requirements NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( HACCP requirements (Hygiene Regulations) NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( Novel Foods and/or GMO Regulations NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( Labelling requirements NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( Administration (such as bookkeeping) require(
ments 
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( Other mandatory food safety and/or quality sys(
tem requirements 
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
12. 
Indicate to what extent your local company feels re9
stricted in innovation by the food legislation that applies 
to your local company:  
1 = Not at all; 7 = to a 
large extent 
NA = not applicable  
( We feel restricted in product(innovation (develop(
ing and selling new products) 
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( We feel restricted in process innovation (changing 
our production processes) 
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( We feel restricted in conquering new or developing 
existing markets 
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( We feel restricted in developing new managerial & 
organisational structures  
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( We feel restricted in buying raw material NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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D. STRATEGY 
 
13.  
Indicate to what extent the following statements apply 
to your local company (encircle the applicable an9
swer): 
1 = not at all; 4 = neutral 
7 = to a large extent ; NA 
= not applicable 
We adjust the composition of our products to local 
taste 
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We focus at producing and/or selling a product in 
the same way at all our locations 
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We focus on low costs to be able to sell at low 
prices 
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We focus on high quality to be able to ask high 
prices 
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
E. INFORMATION 
 
14. 
Indicate to what extent the following statements 
apply to our local company (encircle the applica9
ble answer) 
1= fully disagree l 4 = neu(
tral; 7 = fully agree 
We are well informed about the food legislation that ap(
plies to our local company 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We have a well(developed information system to comply 
to information requirements that are imposed upon us by 
food legislation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We are well informed about upcoming food legislation 
that is relevant for our company 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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F. ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS 
 
15.  
What is approximately the estimated extra workload for your 
local company (expressed in estimated full time jobs ): 
 
 
( To be able to comply to legal food safety and quality obliga(
tions 
 
....................... 
extra jobs 
( To come up to beyond9compliance wishes of clients  
....................... 
extra jobs 
( To come up to our own beyond9compliance company food 
safety and quality goals  
 
....................... 
extra jobs 
 
16. In this question administrative burdens comprise all costs your company makes 
to comply to food egislation.  
Indicate to what extent the following statements 
apply to your local company (encircle the applicable 
answer) 
 1 Totally disagree l 4 = 
neutral; 7 = fully agree; 
NA = not applicable 
The administrative burdens caused by food legisla(
tion are warranted by the increased food safety and 
quality that is achieved  
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A further Increase of administrative burdens is ac(
ceptable if this increases food safety and quality  
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A decrease in food safety is acceptable if it de(
creases the administrative burdens  
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The benefits caused by food legislation outweigh 
the administrative burdens this legislation provokes  
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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17. 
Food safety and quality legislation for our local com9
pany in the past three years has led to an increase 
of: 
1 = totally disagree; 
4 = neutral; 7 = totally 
agree  
 ( efforts to implement food safety and quality systems 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( information gathering costs about the content of law 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( information processing costs to inform governmental or(
ganisations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( information processing costs to buyers of our product 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
G. COMPETITIVENESS 
 
18. 
In exporting food products the food legislation which 
applies to our local company  
creates a disadvantage 9 advantage over companies 
in 
1 = big disadvantage; 
4 = neutral; 7 = big ad(
vantage  
NA = does not apply  
( The EU  NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( The USA NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( Brazil NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( Other developed countries  NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( Newly Industrialised countries NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
( Less developed countries NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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19. 
In importing raw material and/or ingredients the food 
legislation which applies to our local company cre9
ates a disadvantage 9 advantage over companies in: 
1 = big disadvantage; 
4 = neutral; 7 = big ad(
vantage  
NA = does not apply  
( The EU  NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( The USA NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( Brazil NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( Other developed countries  NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( Newly Industrialised countries NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
( Less developed countries NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
20. 
Indicate whether your company is MORE (1) or LESS 
(7) restricted by food legislation than by: 
  
 1 =more restricted ; 
 4 = neutral; 7 = less re(
stricted  
 NA = not applicable 
( Tax legislation   NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( Social security legislation  NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( Employment (safety) law  NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( Environmental law  NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( Spatial planning law  NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
21. 
If you could choose, which legal environment would you 
prefer with respect to food 
legislation (indicate with a circle): 
1 = Not preferable at all 
4 = neutral; 7 = Highly 
preferable 
The legal environment of the EU  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The legal environment of the USA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The legal environment of Brazil  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The legal environment of (fill in).................................. 
.......................................... 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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22. 
Please answer the following question  1 = do not agree at all; 4 
= neutral; 
7 = totally agree  
The food legislation which applies to our local company is 
good 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
H. CHAIN TRANSPARENCY 
 
23.  
Indicate to what extent the following state9
ments apply to your local company (encircle 
the applicable answer) 
 1 = do not agree at all; 4 
= neutral; 7 = totally 
agree; NA = not applica(
ble 
Our name as processor is clearly visible on the 
package of the final product 
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The origin of the raw material/ingredients in the 
product is clearly visible on the package of the final 
product 
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
24. 
Indicate to what extent the following statements are prefer(
able from the perspective of your local company (encircle 
the applicable answer). We prefer the implementation of 
a legal system that......: 
1 do not agree at all 4 = 
neutral; 7 = totally agree 
 
( obligates to print the name of processors that contributed 
to the end(product on the package of the final product  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( gives a processor in the supply chain the right to print his 
company name on the package of the final product 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( gives an end(producer the choice to print the names of 
previous suppliers on the package of the final product 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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25.  
Indicate to what extent the following statements apply 
to your local company (encircle the applicable an9
swer) 
1= strong decrease 4 = 
neutral; 7 = strong in(
crease 
Mentioning our name on the package of the final product 
causes a much lower (1) ( much higher (7) profit margin for 
our local company 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mentioning our name on the package of the final product 
implicates a much lower (1) ( much higher (7) exports for 
our local company 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mentioning our name on the package of the final product 
implicates a much lower (1) ( much higher (7) turnover for 
our local company  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
26.  
Indicate to what extent the following state9
ments apply to your local company (encircle 
the applicable answer) 
 1 do not agree at all 4 = 
neutral; 7 = totally agree; 
NA = not applicable 
Our company has bargaining power towards the 
main buyers 
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our company has bargaining power towards the 
main suppliers of raw materials 
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our company has access to additional financial re(
sources if needed 
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our company has access to additional human re(
sources if needed 
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our company can buy processing equipment if ex(
tra capacity is needed 
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our company can safeguarding property rights 
(such as recipes, patents et cetera)  
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our company has a sufficient number of buyers  NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our company has sufficient resources to acquire in(
formation for product development 
NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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27. Which food legislation for your local company could be simplified or limited, with9
out impeding on the purpose for which such legislation has been created? Please mo9
tivate your answer.  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
28. Which food legislation requirement(s) do you think are superfluous because simi9
lar or the same regulations already exist? Please motivate your answer. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
29. What is according to your opinion the main restricting and/or annoying factor in 
food legislation, which impedes on your competitive performance? Please motivate 
your answer. 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Additional remarks: 
                                    
                                   
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
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…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
Thanks for your cooperation! 
 
Please return the questionnaire to 
Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI) 
Jo Wijnands 
P.O. Box 29703 
2502 LS The Hague 
The Netherlands 
 
 
 
I would like to receive a summary of the results: 
Name company
 ____________________________________________________________________________ 
Name:   
 ____________________________________________________________________________ 
Address:   
 ____________________________________________________________________________ 
Zip Code:   
 ____________________________________________________________________________ 
City:   
 ____________________________________________________________________________ 
Country:    
 ____________________________________________________________________________ 
E9mail:    
 ____________________________________________________________________________ 
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